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Index of Passions: 9858

*Filed
1/13/43*

A CENTRALIZED FOREIGN NAME FILE FOR THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

x Foreign
x Cottrell, G.W.
x Name File

The importance to this Government of a centralized foreign name file would appear to be paramount, not only for war needs, but still more for intelligent American leadership in international problems on a permanent basis after the war. Other nations have recognized the value of such files, notably Germany and Great Britain. The British files are not likely to be made fully and freely available to this Government, but even if they were made fully available they could hardly be a satisfactory substitute for a comparable file established and maintained by our own Government. Full dependence on British files would result in dependence on British policy and acceptance of British aims. The only adequate alternative is a basically American file, which would draw as extensively as possible upon British as well as other available sources, but which would be designed to foster and implement an independent American policy.

With regard to peace treaties and post-war settlements, persons with experience of Versailles have expressed the opinion that if the Allies of 1918 had possessed better information respecting personalities (of the various countries concerned, and of all classes and ranks) the mistakes of

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Versailles would have been considerably fewer and much less dangerous. For a United States which, after the present war and subsequent peace, must perforce deal with international problems on the most widespread and yet specific scale, on a continuing basis and in the role of leader, information about the personalities of foreign countries, in all categories, becomes of basic importance.

For the war period itself, the value of a name file for purposes of psychological warfare and counter-propaganda should be apparent.

The advantages of a single, centralized file are not merely those of convenience of utilization for all purposes, but (more important) uniformity of presentation, and (most important) exploitation of interconnections (which in separate files might remain concealed) of persons and groups in different geographic areas.

The centralized file would be designed to provide information, from as many sources as possible, about persons of political interest for all areas of the Eastern Hemisphere, not overlooking connections with the Western Hemisphere.

The purpose of the centralized file would be to provide name information covering primarily political attitudes and

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activities (whether open or clandestine), peculiarities of social and financial behavior, points of psychological interest, affiliations with organizations (open or clandestine). Its value would depend largely on the extent that confidential material was incorporated in it.

With these features the centralized name file would be of first-line value for

1. Intelligence operations
2. Counter-intelligence operations
3. Psychological warfare
4. Counter-propaganda
5. Occupation and administration of enemy or enemy-held territory
6. Treaties at end of war
7. Post-war reconstruction
8. Continuing participation by the United States in extra-national and international affairs, in a necessarily preponderant role.

name PL 9857
x HODGKIN
x Cottrell

December 31, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO MR. OEGHNER

There is attached certain information furnished me by Mr. Cottrell of this office regarding a centralized foreign name file.

This is the subject that we discussed a few days ago.

DB
David Bruce

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

December 23, 1942

O. W. Cottrell

Major D. K. E. Bruce

Centralized Foreign Name File

I am sending you herewith a draft of a proposal for a centralized name file, in accordance with our recent conversation. I could wish that the circumstances of composition (bad plus sulphadiazine) were not so apparent in the product, but I judged it advisable to get something down on paper and in your hands as soon as possible.

A copy of the draft is being sent Mr. Bell.
Other copies are available.

O. W. Cottrell

Cottrell, O. W.
12/23/42

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A CENTRALIZED FOREIGN FILE FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

At the present time, the United States Government lacks a centralized name file of persons in the Eastern Hemisphere and concerned primarily with political, social, and psychological attitudes and activities. The one really extensive Government file of this general type, that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, covers the United States, with extensions into Latin America. Such Government files as do pertain to the Eastern Hemisphere (State Department, WFO, WFO, WFO, Department of Commerce, Research and Analysis Branch of OGC, etc.) exhibit one or more of the following limitations: restriction to particular geographic areas (with attendant loss of interrelations of persons and groups); derivation of material from published sources only or from the documents of a single agency; orientation in directions other than political (such as biographical, military, economic); use of cards merely for reference to documents rather than for presentation of information; casual and disparate rather than systematic and centralized methods of compilation; obscurity. (Detailed analyses of existing Government files have been prepared, and are available for consultation.)

Yet the importance to this Government of a centralized foreign name file would appear to be paramount, not only for war needs, but also more for intelligence American leadership in international problems on permanent basis after the war. Other nations have recognized the value of such files, notably Germany and Great Britain. The British files are not likely to be made fully and freely available to this Government, and

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even if they were made fully available they could hardly be a satisfactory substitute for a comparable file established and maintained by our own Government. Full dependence on British files would result in dependence on British policy and acceptance of British aims. The only adequate alternative is a basically American file, which would draw as extensively as possible upon British as well as all other available sources, but which would be designed to foster and implement an independent American policy.

The importance of name information for occupation of territory has already been demonstrated in the course of the Anglo-American occupation of Algeria and French Morocco, while at the present time personality problems in connection with the potential occupation of Italy, France, the Balkans, etc., not to speak of Germany, loom larger and larger, problems that can be solved only by assembling the greatest possible amount of name information. With regard to peace treaties and post-war settlements, persons with experience of Versailles have expressed the opinion that if the Allies of 1919 had possessed better information respecting personalities (of the various countries concerned, and of all classes and ranks) the mistakes of Versailles would have been considerably fewer and much less dangerous. For a United States which, after the present war and subsequent peace, must perforce deal with international problems on the most widespread and yet specific scale, on a continuing basis and in the role of leader, information about the personalities of foreign countries, in all categories, becomes of basic importance.

For the war period itself, the value of a name file for purposes of psychological warfare and counter-propaganda should be apparent. Equally obvious are the special values of name information for both intel-

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signals and counter-intelligence work, whether in war or in peace. For counter-intelligence work in particular some information is a primary point of departure.

It must be stressed that a single centralized file enjoys fundamental and decisive advantages over a series of separate files for particular areas, no matter how complete these separate files may be within their geographic limits. The advantages of a single, centralized file are not solely those of convenience of utilization for all purposes, but (more important) uniformity of presentation, and (most important) exploitation of interconnections (which in separate files might remain concealed) of persons and groups in different geographic areas.

A centralized file would, further, tend to reduce duplication in many files, since it would inevitably absorb many smaller files previously distinct and independent. A certain number of separate files would still be maintained, such as files for particular areas or subjects developed by specialists for their own reference. But as the central file grew in bulk, reliability, and availability for service, more and more of the files at present separate would be attracted into it, until only those whose separateness was imperative would remain unincorporated, and even these, it is to be supposed, would be linked with the central file by routine channels for transmitting or exchanging information.

The centralized file would be designed to provide information, from as many sources as possible, about persons of political interest for all areas of the Eastern Hemisphere, not overlooking connections with the Western Hemisphere. As it approached completeness, a negative answer to

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the typical request for information on a particular individual would become more meaningful. This ideal of implementation could be approximated in practice by thorough coverage of each and every specific source of material, thereby reducing the by and by number of other sources to be explored by anyone seeking to exhaust the sources of information already at hand. Coverage of printed and free material would necessarily be less systematic, but works like local Yellow Pages and telephone directories would be noted and arrangements made for their immediate availability on demand.

The purpose of the centralized file would be to provide some information concerning primarily political attitudes and activities (whether open or clandestine), peculiarities of social and financial behavior, points of psychological interest, affiliations with organizations (open or clandestine). Its value would depend largely on the extent that confidential material was incorporated in it. Agencies receiving material that requires the strictest safeguards of security should therefore be the ones to enjoy the closest liaison with the central file, both in physical proximity and in special arrangements to protect their interests while providing a constant flow of information. Past experience suggests a variety of such special arrangements.

With these features the centralized name file would be of first-line value for

1. Intelligence operations
2. Counter-intelligence operations
3. Psychological warfare
4. Counter-propaganda
5. Organization and administration of enemy or enemy-held territory

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6. Transition at end of year
7. Post-war reconstruction
8. Continuing participation by the United States in international and domestic affairs, in a mutually beneficial way.

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PROPOSAL

- I. It is proposed to establish as a special function of the Office of Strategic Services a centralized name file devoted primarily to the Mexican Mexicans and designed to be of service to the United States Government generally, within the limits.
- II. It is proposed that the name file be administered as a special unit of the Office of Strategic Services, independent of any of the existing branches or divisions. Administrative and jurisdictional arrangements would, however, require special consideration, following acceptance of the general proposal.
- III. It is proposed that the potentialities of the name file for continuing and increasing value after the war be regarded as a primary consideration in its creation and maintenance.
- IV. It is proposed that the name file now maintained by the SI Branch of the Office of Strategic Services be made the nucleus for the new centralized file. For details of this SI file, known as the Geographic Index of Persons, see page 7 below.
- V. It is proposed that the new file be housed in Washington in as central a location as possible, taking into account space requirements (see under Space Requirements below), considerations of security, and proximity to those offices whose members will, for reasons of security, have most often to consult the file in person.

The following sections will provide a commentary on specific aspects of this proposal.

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DISSEMINATION INDEX OF PERSONS

The all name file, known as the Geographic Index of Persons, forms a separate unit of the Reporting Board of RI. It is under the direction of G. W. Cottrill, and is housed in Room 1135 and 1142 of the Building. Contacts as of December 31, 1943, totaled approximately 21,000 names. Work on the Index was begun in June 1941, with a staff of three. Full expansion to the present staff of seven took place in September (for details of staff see under Initial Personnel Needs below). In recent years the average weekly increase in cards has been 1100, not including an additional 600 a week received until very recently from the RI Inter-cept Unit. The Geographic Index exhibits the following special features which render it peculiarly adapted to serve as a nucleus for the centralized file (indeed, it may confidently be stated that no other Government file is set up to cover all areas of the Eastern Hemisphere in a coordinated sense or offers nearly so large a combination of these advantages):

1. It is designed to supply personal information of a political, mental, and psychological nature, with special attention to subversive and contacts, and to political attitudes and activities respecting the United Nations and the United States in particular. Merely biographical information of the usual type has been included only as it has provided a framework for the sorts of information of special interest.

2. The Index is arranged geographically, on the basis of major political subdivisions. These subdivisions are grouped into

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general geographic sections, such as Central Europe, Africa, New York, etc., with a particular member of the Index staff in charge of each section. A straight alphabetical file, maintained in the SI file room, provides full control over the geographic arrangements.

3. Administratively, the Index forms a single unit, which makes possible full correlation of each geographic area with other areas.
4. Material for all areas is carded and filed according to a uniform and coordinated system.
5. The collecting of name information is the primary objective of the Index unit, rather than a subsidiary activity to be pursued in the intervals between more pressing duties.
6. Name information is deliberately and actively sought, as well as received. Such seeking is directed not only to the addition or extension of routine channels for a continuous flow of name material but also to the discovery and exploitation of special single sources (e.g., informants, private files).
7. Routine as well as special channels for name material serve a wide variety of sources, in contrast to the type of file based on the reports and other documents of a single agency. A special feature is the inclusion of intercept material. At present published material plays a minor part.

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4. Each card is designed to reproduce the information with accuracy and completeness, so that in practice consultation of the document is almost always certain; the indexer is special since being able to decide quickly which of several documents merits consideration.

5. Each card contains material from one document only, which permits of strict chronological arrangement of all material pertaining to a given person, or, also when possible the suppression, either temporarily or permanently, of material from particular sources whenever circumstances render such suppression advisable.

10. The Index is set up as an organic whole, so that interconnections of persons and groups in different countries and areas are readily apparent. These interconnections between areas include a person's present or past associates in other areas, trips to other areas, intelligence and party networks, informal political associations, business tie-ups, split families, informants and potential contacts located outside a given area, etc. Cards are filed according to a person's reported location, not according to a person's basic area; cross-reference cards are inserted for persons located outside their basic area. This system of filing, which is contrary to the 'basic area' system necessarily followed in the other existing name files, automatically relates to a person located outside his basic area information which would be stated if his cards were filed solely by basic area. In this general connection, the

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extensive United States file included in the Index, with control made by foreign nationality and by subjective groups, has proved to be of great value. Reports of the Foreign Nationalities Branch have been particularly helpful in clarifying political affiliations abroad through analysis of numerous groups in the United States.

11. Attention of interconnections between individuals even within the same country makes it possible at times to gauge an individual's political position from cards on whom associates of his are so readily known.

12. The staff of the Index has experience in handling name information at all the various levels of security. In cooperation with the Geographic Sections of ST, certain cards, of actual or potential contacts, are kept in a segregated file, in special security, and are accessible only to the pertinent desks.

13. Aside from the servicing of properly authorized requests for information on individual names or groups of names, the Index staff is in a position to reproduce, in the form of special reports and at relatively short notice, all name information on a given area, for ST use. The staff is also prepared to cooperate in the carrying out of special name projects, on proper authorization.

14. Index material is made available to the OSS Security Office; officers of the Security Office consult the Index daily.

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20. Since the Index was begun only in June 1952, the material included is primarily very recent or contemporaneous. A special effort is made to keep it up to date in all areas, with the covering of the latest press reports, cables, etc., as well as formal communications.

A list of projects pending or suggested in connection with the Index is given in Appendix 3, by way of example of various types of interpretation which might be undertaken for a centralized file immediately on the establishment; many of these projects are too ambitious for the Index in its present status, because of limitations both of staff and space. It should be emphasized that this list is in no sense to be taken as exhaustive, even for the Index, and of course much less for the centralized file. It is rather appended as an illustration of certain possibilities now current. It should further be pointed out that a large proportion of the items on the list are of very recent development; new suggestions, both for expansion of coverage and expansion of service, are proposed almost daily.

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A survey of the CIA and its various offices with experience gained in administering the CI file from June to December 1945, indicates that the chief sources for a centralized file would be the following:

1. Office of Strategic Services

- a. Research and Analysis
- b. CI and SO
- c. Foreign Nationalities
- d. Intercepts
- e. Security

2. Department of State

3. Military Intelligence Service

4. Office of Naval Intelligence

5. Board of Economic Warfare

6. Department of Commerce

7. Federal Bureau of Investigation

8. Miscellaneous Government Agencies

9. British sources

- a. CI
- b. CI
- c. Diplomatic
- d. other

10. Other United Nations sources

- a. Intelligence
- b. Government-in-Exile
- c. other

11. Private sources

(such as private news files, of which there are a number in existence, some extensive; OSS has already taken steps to secure some of these)

12. Interviews

(particularly with persons recently arrived from foreign countries)

13. Special projects

(such as a study of leading German political personalities, or a study of French generals from a political point of view)

14. Periodical sources

(newspapers, magazines, Who's Who, directories, service lists, etc.)

In the case of various sources (as for example the State Department, MIS, DIA), special authorization would be necessary for extensive channeling of material into the centralized file and for maintenance of effective liaison.

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REQUIREMENTS

1. File to be maintained in a controlled manner, not with an alphabetical general alphabetical file to provide content
2. A specially qualified member of staff (member) to be in charge of the general alphabetical area, an or in charge of the following with geographic and historical background and with material already in file
3. System to be established whereby newly received OSR documents will be regularly available for reading and coding (including interpretation)
4. Have material available in other agencies to be added to the file as opportunity and authorization permit, wherever possible, outside files to be incorporated fully (with necessary revisions) in controlled files, where outside files must necessarily continue, with annotations of material, systems to be established for regular flow of these materials into controlled file
5. Photostating of cards to be used whenever feasible, as for example in cases where the continued separate maintenance of an outside file is necessary, or where an exchange of some material between the controlled file and an outside file is desirable
6. Security to be strictly maintained, in following terms:
 - a. Use of strong rooms or safes for storage of cards
 - b. Cards not to be taken or sent outside the unit
 - c. As one except members of the unit staff to have access to the card trays
 - d. Consultation of cards to be by special request, in a special room, apart from trays under full supervision of members of unit staff
 - e. Certain categories of cards, requiring special restrictions in use, to be kept in segregated files, to be shown only to persons particularly concerned

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Material on the controlled name file should be available to the following, always under terms of full security and authorization:

1. Executive Offices of the Government
2. Office of Strategic Services
 - a. JCS staff
 - b. OI
 - c. Research and Analysis
 - d. Foreign Nationalities
 - e. Security
3. Department of State
4. Office of War Information

(for psychological warfare and counter-propaganda)
5. Military Intelligence Service
6. Office of Naval Intelligence
7. Federal Bureau of Investigation
8. Other Government agencies, on proper authorization
9. Allied Governments, within certain carefully established limits
10. Private organizations or individuals, in certain special cases.

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Types of personnel needed

1) Head of Unit

2) Assistant

to assist in developing and maintaining the unit's files necessary for the adequate functioning of the unit, and to assist in administration, handling of interviews, acting for requests for service, etc.

3) Readers

to abstract documents, dictate and check cards; to be organized on geographic basis; to work closely with persons seeking information or consulting cards

4) Stenographers

to type cards from dictation of readers and from material furnished by other offices needing little revision

5) File clerks

a) to file cards

b) to extract cards for particular purposes (for this function persons of relatively high ability would be needed; since the procedure would in no case be automatic)

6) Secretaries

for telephone, appointments, letters, reception, etc.

7) Photographic unit

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Initial personnel needs

Ultimate personnel needs for such an undertaking cannot be accurately anticipated, particularly at the outset. Presumably there would be a rather extended period of rapid expansion, both of volume of material and opportunity for service, followed by a reduction in the inflow of material as accumulations of noninformation become exhausted and raw material became the chief source. On the other hand, a steady increase in requests for service and in liaison requirements should be expected. The staff listed below should serve to handle the undertaking on a scale which should ensure expensiveness and consequent diversified service within a relatively short space of time. (A beginning could of course be made with a smaller staff, but development of the file would be correspondingly restricted.) Additional personnel in various categories would undoubtedly prove necessary as the file expanded. For readers, persons trained in research should be sought, since on the average such persons are better equipped to deal with the problems of order, judgment, and expression that are inherent in the abstracting of documents. From time to time it might be advisable to include in typed lists information that, to protect its source, must be paraphrased and combined with other material. Readers with research training would stand ready to do this sort of work under supervision, as well as to assemble information on individuals of particular groups, localities, or activities. An initial staff is listed as follows:

Head

3 Associates

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3 Readers

4 Stenographers

4 File clerks

3 Photographers

(or financial provision might be made for the use of the
CIA photographic unit, at least on the outside)

2 Secretaries

Total salary cost approximately \$65,000 per year. It might be well to include an additional \$15,000 for additional staff and for promotions, making a total of \$80,000. It may be noted that the Geographic Index of Persons of SI has had a staff of 7 since September, made up as follows:

Head of Office	\$1400
Assistant	\$400
General Secretary and Office Manager (also serv- ing as Reader)	\$600
Readers (2)	\$200 each
Secretary-Stenographers (2)	\$150 each.

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Here again, minimum needs are hardly to be followed at the end of.
An ideal arrangement would be

- a. a strong room or series of strong rooms, without windows, capable of housing 2,000,000 cards; the cards to be kept in filing cases after the addition of library catalogue, with tables for standing accumulation of a given tray
- b. a room or series of rooms for readers and stenographers
- c. entrance room (reception)
- d. reading room for the consultation of selected cards by authorized persons, in collaboration with a number of staff
- e. reference room or library containing as full an assemblage as possible of published works of reference on names (Who's Who, etc.), and such other referenced works as would be needed for the work of the unit (maps, guides, year books, etc.)
- f. offices for head and assistants

The more closely actual space arrangement approximated this ideal the more efficiently the unit might be expected to function.

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Estimated Costs

Provision should be made for:

- a. Office furniture
- b. Card files
- c. Typewriters
- d. Office supplies (primarily cards)
- e. Books, etc.
- f. Occasional travel, to arrange liaison regarding other case files, conduct special interrogations, etc.

Initial outfitting and annual maintenance not estimated.

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ATTACHMENT 2

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

GENERAL NAME COLLECTION

(as of December 14, 1944)

1. Preparation of full name lists for various areas, at special request, as for example Southeastern Europe and Turkey, now considered for completion.
2. Preparation of periodic supplements to special name lists already compiled.
3. Indication of types of new material desired, to be picked up and forwarded by SI representatives in the field (something has already been done in this line, but much more could be done).
4. Establishment and maintenance of a system for making name information available to the training schools, in full security (possibly through photostating of cards).
5. Inclusion in the Index of Far Eastern name material recently acquired by the Far Eastern Section of SI (2,000 cards).
6. Inclusion in the Index of name material available in certain sections of Research and Analysis and not yet incorporated (as for example 2,000 cards on the Near East).
7. Completion of checking of documents in Central Information Division.
8. Systematic and continued exploitation of pertinent name material available in Foreign Nationalities Branch (machinery for this fully existent).
9. Systematic and continued exploitation of pertinent name material in State Department, HIS, ONI, FBI, NSA, Department of Commerce, etc.
10. Systematic extension of contacts with private groups and individuals likely to have name information (to be done partly through Foreign Nationalities Branch, partly through miscellaneous channels; could be a very large-scale operation).
11. Collaboration with Research and Analysis Branch in special projects (e.g., for Northwest Africa, Western Europe, Central Europe).
12. Inclusion in the Index of German name file obtained in London by SI, consisting (5,000 cards).
13. Inclusion in the Index of German name file to be obtained in New York by Mr. Jones (very extensive file--reported to contain tens of thousands of cards; to be translated and sent to Index in Washington).

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4. Study of 270 members by German authorities (10,000 index cards for name interferences, particularly concerning names of persons, officials, etc. names might be useful for identifying persons in connection with occupation of Germany).
15. Collaboration in a proposed large-scale study of leading German persons, civilian and military (German language project).
16. Study of British perambulation (arrivals, military leaders, prominent persons generally, agents, etc.).
17. Systematic collection on a wide range of name information for use in connection with occupation of territory, post-war planning, etc. (names, language international planning and operations).
18. Supplying of name information to Office of War Information for purposes of psychological warfare and counter-propaganda.
19. Supplying of name information for counter-propaganda purposes.
20. Full exploitation of GAB material received from Cairo.
21. Expansion of facilities to handle anticipated increase in flow of German, GI and British material.
22. Expedited photostating of cards for London office of GAB, with establishment of a system of continuous interchange of cards between London and Washington (London to set up a file parallel to Washington, and to order to fill in gaps, particularly with British material).
23. Completion of lists of selected names to be sent to England for study in; with British GAB.
24. Securing of name information from the Special Political Warfare Bureau (five files in England).
25. Cooperation in photostatic duplication of entire Index (Class A for hundred cards) for a special purpose (duplication authorized, photostating begun).
26. Maintenance and maintenance; in conjunction with Intercept Unit, of procedure for systematic inclusion of intercept name material in Index.
27. Preparation and maintenance of special watch list for Intercept Unit.
28. Development of possible contacts covered by following up residents in U.S. of letters from abroad suggesting potential use as contact (names derived initially from intercepts; 1,000 men to be used to follow up residents).

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Dr. William L. Ringer

Frederick G. Ringer

Questionnaire Concerning Banking Unit

I am sending you herewith a draft of the proposed questionnaire for sampling the market for the purchase of an insuring unit. I hope that you will have time to review this questionnaire extensively so that the final form can be determined at the meeting in Friday.

Attachments

cc/Colonel Dimovany
Members of the Interdepartmental Committee

Dr. William L. Rogers

Frederick S. Kilgore

Questionnaire Committee, Task Force 101

I am sending you herewith a draft of the proposed questionnaire for sampling the market for the products of an underlying unit. I hope that you will have time to review this questionnaire extensively so that the final form can be determined at the meeting on Friday.

Attachments

cc/Colonel Donovan
Members of the Interdepartmental Committee

DRAFT OF PROPOSED QUESTIONNAIRE
TO SOUND OUT THE "MARKET" FOR A SUBJECT INDEXING UNIT

The purpose of this Questionnaire is to aid each member of the Committee in inquiring of his agency whether or not his agency would be able to use a subject index of the publications acquired by the Committee, what type of a subject index the agency would desire, and how many directives the agency would expect to give the Indexing Unit.

There are two fundamental questions to be answered first:

1) a. Should every item in all publications be indexed in the manner of the New York Times Index or the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature?

b. Should only subjects requested by specific directives be indexed?

2) a. Should the index serve merely as a guide post, giving the location of a desired subject in a publication on the microfilm?

b. Should the index attempt to extract everything about a given subject so that it will not be necessary to use the microfilm of the original publication at all?

(7215)

2--Draft of a Proposed Questionnaire to Sound Out the "Market" for
A Subject Indexing Unit

c. Or should the index be a compromise between these
two extremes?

The following are five possible types of index entries:

I. U.S. - Ships - Production.

Cargo ship goal boosted for 1943.

Washington Post. Dec. 4, 1942 p. 6 #320

II. Same

(plus note of Tables, Maps, etc.)

"Graph show monthly shipyard production"

III. Same

(plus descriptive annotation)

"New objective to produce 17 to 18 million tons
next year."

IV. Same

(plus qualitative annotation)

"Generalized half-column article stating that
1943 objective will be 17 to 18 million tons."

3--Draft of a Proposed Questionnaire to Sound Out the "Market" for
A Subject Indexing Unit

V. Same

(plus abstract)

Ship production for 1943 to be 17 to 18 million tons. Increase due to enormous production pace set by Kaiser yards and to firing of large quantities of steel for shipbuilding. This year's goal was threatened by conversion of shipyards to production of specialized Naval equipment. Merchant ship ways expected to produce three ships a day by end of 1942 and four ships a day in early 1943.

3) Is there any existing scheme for subject headings such as that of the Library of Congress that should be used for such an index?

4) Should the subject headings be arranged alphabetically or within some classification scheme?

5) What is the estimated number of directives that the agency can be expected to give to an Indexing Unit?

(Each directive should be as exclusive as possible.

A directive such as "Food", or "Food shortage", or "Meat shortage", or "Meat shortage - Germany" should not be given when "Meat shortage - Schleswig Holstein" accurately describes all the material desired.)

(7215)

4--Draft of a Proposed Questionnaire to Sound Out the "Market" for
A Subject Indexing Unit

6. What separate permanent files such as officials, ships,
military officers, pictures, etc. should be maintained?


7. Should all publications be covered for each directive?

8. What should be the format of the published index?

a. Should it be printed so that it can be cut up for
pasting onto index cards of a given size?

b. How frequent should it be issued?

c. Should it be cumulative?



MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
FROM: G. Edward Buxton
SUBJECT: Machinery established for
interviewing returned travelers

I return the attached in accordance
with your request.

This seems to grow out of the BW-OSB
agreement approved by the Joint Chiefs last Summer
and which appeared to give BW a priority on inter-
viewing in the economic field. If that be a fair
interpretation this gets control of the situation
back 50% in our hands. It is a by-product that
might annoy Colonel Sharpe who claims to be doing
the same thing. This, however, should not in any
way be a moving consideration.

I presume that the files of Oral
Intelligence will be made available as a useful
index of travelers who have returned in the last
year and a quarter.

GEB.

GEB:FB


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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Interception 8995
X Inouellorin
X B. E. W.
X M. E. W.
X Security Coord.

November 4, 1942

TO: COLONEL BUXTON
FROM: COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Will you look at this and return it to me.


William J. Donovan

SECRET

5991

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

DATE: November 8, 1942

FROM: William L. Langer

SUBJECT: Machinery established for interviewing Returned Travelers

Attached for your information and files is a draft of a Memorandum on Interviewing Returned Travelers. It consists of terms of an agreement we have reached with BEW, the British Security Coordination, and MEW concerning interviewing returned travelers.

Reference is made at several points to a joint BEW-OSS Survey of Foreign Personnel project in New York. This project was arranged in New York at a meeting on October 5th of representatives from BEW, SA/B (in New York, and Mr. John D. Wilson of R & A. The project consists of building a file of refugees who have come into the country in the past several years and who are knowledgeable on the enemy's economy. The file will include background information on the individuals concerned as well as some indication of previous interviews which these individuals may have undergone.

There also is to be attached to the Survey of Foreign Personnel group in New York three or four people who will do interviewing at the request of OSS or BEW. Copies of these interviews will be made available to both OSS and BEW. The financing of the Survey of Foreign Personnel project in New York City is being divided between the Board of Economic Warfare and the New York office of SA/B, Office of Strategic Services.

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research & Analysis

Attachment

October 23, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM ON THE BRITISH AND UNITED STATES

At a meeting in the Board of Economic Warfare on October 13, 1942, attended by Mr. Dobby of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, Mr. Wilson of the British Security Coordination, Mr. Pratt and Mr. Wilson of the Office of Strategic Services and Mr. Vail of the Board of Economic Warfare, the following points were discussed and arranged:

I. Notification on Incoming Travelers

- A. British Security Coordination will attempt to secure from Lisbon and such control points as Bermuda and Trinidad, advance passenger lists of each neutral ship going to any port in the Western Hemisphere. This passenger list will contain names of passengers, addresses of destination, and some particulars as to background, profession, and countries of recent residence.

In cases where vessels have called at British controlled points i.e., Bermuda, Trinidad, and Jamaica, copies of traveler conscription reports will be made available either in addition to or in place of passenger lists.

This information will be supplied to the Joint BW-OSO Personnel projects in New York with copies to Mr. Dobby of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, Mr. Wilson of the Office of Strategic Services, and Mr. Vail of the Board of Economic Warfare.

Survey of Foreign

- B. The Board of Economic Warfare is to continue to make every effort to obtain from OWI and FBI sources all possible information on all passengers entering any port in the United States whether traveling by ship or by air. This information will be supplied to Mr. Wilson of the British Security Coordination, by the Survey of Foreign Personnel, Mr. Wilson of the Office of Strategic Services, and Mr. Dobby of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

II. Interviewing of TravelersA. The List

Travelers proceeding to New York and who appear to have information of economic value will be approached and interviewed wherever possible by the Survey of Foreign Personnel. Copies of these interviews will be sent to all of the persons named in I-B above.

In addition to being interviewed as economic matters, these men's passengers will be asked certain questions relating to other fields in order that their knowledge and their professions in these fields may be evaluated for possible future use.

II. OTHER UNITED STATES OFFICES

Travelers proceeding to cities other than New York will be interviewed by the field staff working under the direction of the Board of Economic Warfare. It is assumed that a particular individual may be expected to have information of considerable interest. Before these interviews will be needed as above.

1. Cities outside the United States

Travelers proceeding to cities in Central and Latin American countries and remaining in Germany and other British possessions will be interviewed by special arrangements, as follows:

1. Where British Security Cooperation has an adequate staff, interviews will be made by this staff. Copies will be disposed of as above.
2. Where this is not the case, the Board of Economic Warfare foreign personnel will be used to hold the interviews. Arrangements on interviewing these travelers will be cleared between Mr. Vail and Mr. Ratty.

III. Subjects of Interviews

Original interviews will of necessity have to be general in nature, tied in closely with the particular field of knowledge of the individual. From time to time, interviewers will be mobilized to obtain as much specific information on particular economic matters as happen to be of immediate interest to the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, Office of Strategic Services, and the Board of Economic Warfare. Questions related to the following subjects should be asked in addition to the normal economic questions:

- a. Familiarity with method of escape from occupied countries.
- b. Familiarity with local topography.

- c. Specific acquaintance with local personalities.
- d. Opinions and facts on morale, political questions, propaganda and radio broadcasts of a specific nature.

17. Intelligence Files

All knowledge obtained on any individual will be lodged in the World of Economic Warfare Central Source File in Washington where it will be freely available to the British Ministry of Economic Warfare and to the Office of Strategic Services. This file will be cross-indexed not only as to countries of greatest familiarity, names and fields of economic knowledge, but also as to knowledgability in the general fields of:

- a. Familiarity with method of escape from occupied countries.
- b. Familiarity with local topography.
- c. Specific acquaintance with local personalities.
- d. Opinions and facts on morale, political questions, propaganda and radio broadcasts of a specific nature.

In addition knowledge obtained on each individual will be lodged in the files of the joint BW-OSS Survey of Foreign Personnel project in New York.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

Insurance 8-4-42
 X Newspaper
 X O.S. Agents

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: October 29, 1942

FROM: Captain Doering

SUBJECT: Insurance for S.O. and S.I. agents abroad

We are still investigating the possibility of providing adequate death and disability compensation for S.O. and S.I. agents serving abroad. Our provisional conclusions based upon what we have learned to date, are as follows:

1. General S.O. and S.I. Agents.

Colonel Rehm advises us that in most cases our S.O. and S.I. agents will be satisfied with the same coverage as provided by the National Service Life Insurance Act. (i.e. \$10,000 maximum death benefit). There appear to be the following possible ways of providing some or part of this compensation.

(a) Payment out of General OSS Funds. The Bureau of the Budget has struck out of our most recent allocation letter authority to pay up to \$10,000 compensation in the case of any OSS employee killed or incapacitated in line of duty. In taking this action, officials at the Bureau verbally expressed their view that the Director of OSS might properly authorize such payments out of unvouchered funds, if he determined that they were made for a confidential purpose which would aid in the successful prosecution of the War. Such a determination might be justified on the grounds that (a) our civilian agents are not eligible for National Service Life Insurance and (b) for security reasons it is not possible to insure them with a private company. However, if the number of our agents is to increase as presently contemplated and if a large number of these may be killed or incapacitated in the line of duty, such payments would prove an undue strain upon our general funds unless an adequate reserve is set up and provision therefor made in our Budget. If it seems that this is the best way to meet the problem, it will be necessary to take this matter up again with the Bureau of the Budget and to secure in our next allocation letter sufficient funds for this purpose.

(b) Payments of Benefits under United States Employees Compensation Act. This Act provides for the payment of compensation for death or

Colonel Donovan

- 2 -

October 29, 1942

disability resulting from personal injury to a "civil employee" of the United States at the rate of not in excess of \$116.66 per month, or approximately \$6500 commutation value based on 60 monthly payments. Election by the employee or his dependents to accept these benefits renders them ineligible to receive any other "salary, pay or remuneration whatsoever" on account of such death or disability from the United States. Benefits under this Act do not seem to present any security problem since apparently no names need be filed with the Compensation Commission until proof of claim is made.

Although on its face this Act clearly seems to include our S.O. and S.I. agents as "civil employees of the United States", some question seems to have been raised as to whether they are covered. Also there is some doubt as to whether the Commission will construe "personal injury" to include injury resulting from typhus and other war-time epidemic diseases. We propose to canvass these questions with the Commission shortly.

(c). Private Group Insurance. The FBI carries group insurance for its agents with a private insurance company, and Colonel Rehm has investigated the possibility of our doing the same thing. He has concluded that for security reasons this would not be possible. Very few companies are prepared even to consider underwriting a risk of this sort, especially where full disclosure cannot be made, and no company is apparently prepared to offer such insurance without having at least the names of the persons insured. Lloyds, who were most receptive of any company approached, insisted that a complete list of names of the insured be transmitted to their London office. Commander Vanderbilt has undertaken to make further inquiries of insurance men whom he knows who may be able to suggest some way out of this impasse. Unless these security objections can be overcome, however, it seems that the possibility of OSS providing any form of private group insurance must be abandoned.

(d) National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940. The Act in its present form does not cover civilian employees of OSS. It is our view, concurred in by Colonel Rehm, that the Act could not be amended to extend its benefits to our agents without an undesirable breach of security. Not only would such an amendment require disclosure on the floor of Congress and in Committee of the fact that we have such agents but it would be necessary for us to register the names of these individuals with the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, who is charged with the administration of the Act.

(e) Private Relief Act. Where other compensation is not available and in cases of exceptional hardship, it is frequently the practice of Congress to pass a private relief Act. I understand that the sums voted do not usually exceed \$10,000. This does not seem to

Colonel Donovan

- 3 -

October 29, 1942

be a satisfactory solution to our problem. Such Acts would not usually be passed until considerably after the war, and, of course, our men could not rely on their being passed at all.

2. Special S.O. and S.I. Agents.

I understand that in a few cases our secret agents are individuals who enjoyed large incomes in private life and who wish to take out insurance considerably in excess of \$10,000.

It is quite clear that under none of the Government benefit schemes referred to above is any coverage available in an amount greater than \$10,000. If such insurance is to be provided at all, it will have to be provided by private companies, and we are inclined to believe that any arrangements for such insurance will have to be made by each agent individually. In many cases our agents will go abroad under cover which normally would permit them to obtain a considerable amount of insurance, even though at a high premium, provided they did not disclose their connection with OSS. Such a failure to disclose would undoubtedly give the insurance company a good defense against a claim. It is Colonel Rehm's experience that where full disclosure is made, none of the larger or more reputable insurance companies will even consider the risk. There has been, however, one case of an individual agent who, without disclosing his connection with OSS did attempt to disclose the extent of the risk to be assumed. He was able to obtain approximately \$40,000 insurance divided up among 4 small and relatively unknown insurance companies who undertook the risk at a high premium. Commander Vanderbilt is also going to make further inquiry along these lines, and we will make a further report to you shortly.

It seems doubtful, however, whether any satisfactory arrangement can be worked out for private insurance, either for the group or for individuals, and it is certain that no arrangement can be worked out in the immediate future.

Col. R. J., Jr.

CC: Commander Vanderbilt
Colonel Rehm

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

TO: Mr. James Murphy

DATE: October 27, 1942

FROM: Captain Doering

SUBJECT: Insurance for S.I. and S.O. agents working abroad

I am returning herewith Mr. Cresswell's memorandum of October 14 to Major Bruce and Major Bruce's covering memorandum to you of October 16 both relating to this matter.

In my view there is no way in which we can safely ask for an amendment of the National Service Life Insurance Act to cover our secret agents. To do so would involve (1) publicity on the floor of Congress and in Committee as to the fact that we are employing such agents for work abroad and (2) disclosure of at least the names of these agents to the Administrator of Veterans Affairs who is charged with the administration of the Act. Colonel Rehn and others with whom we have discussed the matter are unanimously of the view that these consequences involve too great a security risk.

Although I do not believe that Mr. Cresswell's suggestion is the proper way to handle the problem this office is working closely with Commander Vanderbilt in an effort to find some way to provide adequate coverage for our agents.

[Signature] Jr.

Attachment

CC: Commander Vanderbilt

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: David Bruce

DATE: October 16, 1942

TO: Mr. Murphy

SUBJECT:

There is attached a copy of a memorandum prepared by Mr. Cresswell under date of October 14, 1942.

From the standpoint of SI and SO, this is an important thing to have the Colonel's advice upon.

David Bruce

David Bruce

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****INTEROFFICE MEMO****FROM: Robert Cresswell****DATE: October 14, 1948****TO: David Bruce****SUBJECT:**

There was introduced in the Senate yesterday a bill extending to the personnel of the Civilian Air Patrol the benefits of the National Service Insurance Fund. Responsible for the measure is Senator Pepper of Florida.

Do you think it would be possible to persuade Senator Pepper to amend his bill so as to extend the coverage to civilian employees of the O.S.S.? Almost invariably when our agents are sent abroad, they show a great deal of anxiety to obtain some insurance coverage for themselves in view of the risks they have to run. So far we have been able to do nothing for them along these lines, hence the provision of governmental coverage under the Pepper bill, or other similar measure, would be a real factor in improving the morale of our organization. It would also to some extent decrease the pressure for the commissioning of our agents, since one of the reasons the men want commissions is that they are thereby made eligible for governmental insurance.

R.C.

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

Mr. Harold B. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Ickes:

I thank you for your letter of September 18, 1941 regarding Mr. Kenneth H. Tichnell who was stopped by a park policeman for speeding.

While this office does not consider the offense, there are extraordinary circumstances which require special consideration. Mr. Tichnell has been dispatched from his headquarters to the Smithsonian Laboratory on Capitol Hill to pick up some film that was to be shipped via express to California and had instructions to deliver the film to the airport in time to meet a scheduled departure. Due to an unforeseen delay at the Laboratory he was rather pressed for time to make the plane connections and allowed his enthusiasm to do his job well overrate his sense of caution. He had been informed that the pictures were important to the national war effort and that it was essential that he make the plane connections.

We have discussed with Mr. Tichnell the necessity for these new speed laws and have explained the emergency that are facing us with necessities extreme conservation measures in gasoline and tires. As a result of our conversation I am sure that Mr. Tichnell will be more careful in the future.

As a result of your letter we have mailed all of our drivers of official cars in for a discussion of tire and gasoline conservation and to stress upon them the importance of wholehearted cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

WJ:etp
Encl. Kenneth H. Tichnell
Capt. Cunningham

William J. Donovan

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Captain D. J. Cunningham, USMC
 TO: Mr. Cecil Barnes
 SUBJECT: Kenneth Tichnell, Chauffeur

DATE: September 18, 1942

Concerning Kenneth Tichnell's summons, which he received the 11th of September on the Lincoln Memorial Bridge for speeding, I am familiar with the case and would like you to know all the facts.

Upon my return from California on the 12th of September, the first time Kenneth reported to me was his receiving of a summons. I listened to his side of the story and then to his own. It seems that he had to go to a laboratory where in Washington on that day he had some film that was to be shipped air mail to California. There was a little delay at the laboratory, he was kept there for time to make the film. He wanted to do his job and dictate to me. I don't want you to think we are holding him back. Speaking of the law, but I feel that my drastic measures might tend to kill his natural desire to do a good job.

What I have actually done, rather than give him a severe reprimand is to sit him down and explain the reason for these new speed laws. It is hard for the youth of this country to realize the emergencies that are facing us and I personally feel if we would be less severe and do a little more explaining of the why and wherefore, they would have a better understanding of the country's many problems. Kenneth has given me his word that he will be more careful and look before he leaps.

There is one thing I must say in behalf of the boy. He is a very sincere worker and never has complained about hours. Many times we have had him work until 8 or 9 at night and ordered him back on the job at 7 o'clock in the morning. He always does it willingly and cheerfully. I think this is a very redeeming feature and think we would have to look a long time before we found another such boy.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/18 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100240009-9

Mr. Bennett
Mr. Ogata
Mr. [unclear]

Enc. 2

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/18 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100240009-9

*9/17/42 - Call him.
will pay the fine -
J. R. M.*

DATE 9/16/42

Mr. F. Lincoln

Will you call this boy up and ask him to give you some satisfactory explanation. Try to impress upon him the bad effect which his conduct has had upon the organization and the embarrassment which it has caused the Colonel, after having been brought personally to the attention of the Secretary of the Interior.

James R. Murphy

J. R. M.

*9/17/42 - Call him.
He was driving
the Official Car
will pay the fine -
J. R. M.*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

Tickell 8361
X Tickell



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1942.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

On September 12, at 8:45 a.m., Kenneth H. Tichnell who, it is understood, is an employee of the Coordinator of Information was stopped by a Park policeman when he was speeding on one of the parkways in an automobile at the rate of 46 miles an hour.

I hope that you will agree with me that it is particularly reprehensible for an employee of the Government thus to waste recklessly both gasoline and rubber in view of the emergency that exists with respect to rubber generally and with respect to gasoline in this area. The President himself, as well as other high officials of the Government, have been appealing to the patriotism of our citizens to drive at such a moderate rate of speed as will go far to conserve both rubber and gasoline.

I am sure that you will agree with me that I am only doing my public duty in calling this matter to your attention.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Twenty-fifth and M Streets, NW,
Washington, D. C.

cc: Kenneth H. Tichnell.

January 22, 1941

Dr. David P. Barrows,
Department of Political Science,
University of California,
Berkeley, California.

Dear Doctor Barrows:

I have given careful consideration to the request in your letter of January 12th, and I see no reason why you should not do as you suggest in that letter.

I have been very much interested in reading what you say and respect your point of view. I think therefore that you should express your opinion directly to your friend.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Insular Affairs Bureau, 6917
X War Dept.
X Barrows, S.
X Interior Dept.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 21, 1943

MEMORANDUM for Colonel William J. Donovan:

Subject - General Barrows' Correspondence on
Military Government

I see no reason why the specific question in Barrows' letter of January 12, about transmitting the memorandum, should not be answered affirmatively.

The President seems to have indicated that occupied territory should be handled under the jurisdiction of the State Department as soon as military conditions permit; that is to say, in what the regulations refer to as "the third phase of occupation." The question arose partly because of the controversy over the Charlottesville School, and in reporting on the school I accepted that principle and warned them against infringing it by contemplating activity of military governors after an armistice.

I am not sure the principle is wise. The State Department is not naturally or traditionally an administrative agency but rather a sort of secretariat for communication and contact with foreign nations. The War Department handled well the Cuban and Philippine occupations in the adjustment period after the war and has shown its capacity. Even the imminence of a transfer of authority from a Theatre Commander while troops or lines of communication remain in an occupied area results in divided authority and some, at least, of the

-2-

Generals feel uncomfortable about it.

Authority ought to be restored as promptly as possible by the Army, or anybody else, to the local civil authorities in any case. We evidently contemplate in this war some extended occupations after the cessation of warfare and before a final peace. I am not sure the State Department is best fitted to handle this and the soldiers in the past have shown capacity and judgment.

In short, the question does not seem to me finally settled. This topic has been actively in my mind and I am following it up.

- J.G.P.
J.O.R.

Enclosure: Complete Barrows' File
returned herewith.

Insular Affairs Bureau, 6977
 X War Dept.
 X Bureau, B.
 X Interior Dept.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
 BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

January 12, 1949

Colonel William J. Donovan
 Office of Strategic Services
 25th & E Streets, N.W.
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

On June 18, 1942, I addressed you enclosing a memorandum urging the desirability of reestablishing in the War Department the former Bureau of Insular Affairs as an agency of the President and Secretary of War in handling anticipated problems of military government. I wrote this memorandum in a sense anticipatory of the fact that as soon as our Army entered foreign territory a jurisdictional conflict would occur unless the War Department made provision to occupy the field. The American invasion of North Africa and the fact that General Eisenhower did not proclaim himself military governor appear to have created a vacuum in which there is conflict of method, purpose, and interest between our forces and French personalities in Africa, as well as duality of understanding between the War Department, State Department, Treasury, and other agencies of the government. Unity of command is essential. Reported difference of opinion in the Cabinet as to whether the government of conquered territories should be military or civil while military operations are going on, further increases concern over this and like situations.

May I ask if you would be willing for me to submit confidentially to Army officers, and particularly to one friend who is an instructor in the Army School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, this confidential memorandum which I prepared for your attention? I will appreciate it very much if you feel you can allow this.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

David P. Barrows

100-100

David P. Barrows

Lin Rogers

Will you tell

me about your plans

I think
D

Insular Affairs Bureau
 War Dept
 * Bagshaw, Asst
 * Interior Dept

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COORDINATION OF INFORMATION
 Room 1706, 702 Market Street
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

June 16, 1942

Colonel G. Edward Buxton
 Office of Strategic Services
 25th & E Streets, N. W.
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Buxton:

In accordance with instructions, which I take pleasure in following, and although you are now in Washington, I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum I have just prepared on the old Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, which I would recommend be reestablished. No doubt this matter has already received the consideration of the Secretary of War. Nevertheless, I think it important to press for attention to the matter by the War Department for two reasons: first, because it is essential to have an agency within the War Department for assisting in the handling of the business that will develop immediately after our forces are successful in regaining Insular territories now captured by the enemy; and, second, because if the War Department fails to supply a need, its legitimate field of action may be inadvisably occupied by other departments of government.

To speak very plainly, the fact that the one time duties of the Bureau of Insular Affairs were transferred to a bureau within the Department of the Interior will naturally make the Department of the Interior feel that it is the agency to handle the problem of government and administration in territories which our troops may win back. Furthermore, the State Department, concerned as it exclusively is with all relations with foreign governments, probably will feel that the temporary administration of the colonial dependencies of these so-called governments should rest with them. In my opinion, neither of these departments should have this responsibility, as the War Department should have it and have it completely. Otherwise, the grave task of establishing military governments with the progress of our armed forces will be confused by division of authority and will be very greatly impaired.

For these reasons, might I beg you to read this memorandum and, if you concur in the opinions therein expressed, take up the matter with Colonel Bagshaw and, if he approves, ask that it be considered by the Secretary of War.

Matters are proceeding as usual here. Mr. Goodman, whom I engaged for reports to Lieutenant Commander Vanderbilt, is at work on his films of the places of importance in the region of Malaya.

Colonel G. Edward Burton

-2-


June 19, 1942

We are expecting today or Monday the arrival of Professor Quigley, whose work I will endeavor to assist in every practical way and, while the results of this office do not yet seem to be very important, we find enough to keep us constantly employed.

May I say further that, if the reorganization of the work under its new title and functions as the Office of Strategic Services, calls for any change whatever in the conduct of its business on this coast, I beg to assure you that I do not wish you to give any consideration at all to me or to my position if other and more permanent arrangements are desired by Colonel Donovan.

With best wishes at all times,

Sincerely yours,



DAVID PRESCOTT BARROWS

DBB:W
encl.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
Room 1706, 704 Market Street
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

June 19, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
25th & C Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I enclose a memorandum on the Bureau of
Insular Affairs, War Department, which seems to
me should at this time be re-established. I hope
very much that it may interest you.

With constant best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

David P. Barrows

DEBIPP
Encl.
Copy to Colonel Duxon

David Prescott Barrows

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
 Room 1706, 701 Market Street
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan
 From: David Prescott Barrows
 Subject: Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department

June 19, 1942

1. The determination of our government and allied nations to adopt at the earliest practicable moment an offensive policy recommends that early consideration be given to the conduct of military governments which must be set up in territory now held by the Axis enemies, as soon as lodgment is gained or the enemy expelled.

The necessity for military government, its origin and success under the United States, particularly after 1898, and its administrative principles have been discussed in another memorandum (Notes on Military Government, with covering letter dated May 8, 1942, to Colonel William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information). This minute refers to the establishment within the War Department at Washington of an agency through which may be transmitted to military governments the orders and directives of the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, and the President of the United States, and to give such assistance as has proved useful and practical in the past, both to the War Department and to the military governors in carrying out their political and administrative missions.

2. Accordingly, it is suggested that there be restored, within the War Department, the Bureau of Insular Affairs, and that it early organize and acquire the materials indispensable to its function. The Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department was legislatively established by the organic act for the government of the Philippines of July 1, 1902. It followed the appointment by President McKinley in 1898 of Mr. Elihu Root as Secretary of War, with the distinct purpose of giving a correct legal character to the acts of the Army forces in territories ceded by Spain, or recently acquired by the United States, for which civil government could not be immediately created owing to the necessities of war.

The Bureau of Insular Affairs proved, over many years, a satisfactory agency for the Secretary of War in directing the operations of government in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Panama, and in certain temporary inter-ventive stage American administration rented on the presence of American forces. The Bureau ceased to function as regards Puerto Rico on May 7, 1903 (Executive Order #6726), and was entirely transferred to the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior on July 1, 1919 (Reorganization Plan #2, Part 1, Section 4-4).

Colonel William J. Donovan

-2-

June 19, 1942

3. The reasons for restoring to the War Department the direction and the directive organization of islands and territories wherein, if offensive action succeeds, our armies will be functioning both as operational forces and as governmental authorities, would seem to be clear and conclusive:

a. Strong, adequate, and well-organized authority, for the protection of both the military forces and the native inhabitants, is essential from the moment when bridge heads and landings are secured on foreign soil until and after the whole territory is gained.

b. No administrative organization except a military one, under the commanding general of the armed forces, is tolerable or effective in such a situation. There are abundant lessons from foreign as well as American experience to sustain this thesis.

c. Furthermore, such government obviously can be directed from the United States only by the War Department, and this directive function should lie exclusively with the War Department and not be shared with any other.

d. The experiment has been often tried, and always with unfortunate results, of organizing dependent territories by creating bureaus and administrative agencies, responsible to the several departments of the central government. The French experimented in this manner, with very bad results, in their early administration of Algeria.

The United States, over many years, has attempted to administer the Territory of Alaska in the same manner, by a network of locally unrelated and uncoordinated administrations, all of them reporting directly to departments at Washington. The unsatisfactory results of this system have been reported upon again and again, notably by Mr. Frederick A. Lane, when Secretary of the Interior, but the tenacity of bureaucratic agencies once established has prevented the creation in Alaska of an effective local government and administration. On the other hand, the government of the Philippines, until the coming into effect of the Commonwealth Act, was administered solely under the Secretary of War, and was a fortunate example of correct administration.

e. The advantages of restoring the Bureau of Insular Affairs, rather than creating a new War Department agency, would seem to lie in the following considerations: (1) the title is familiar to officers of the United States Army and requires little or no explanation; (2) the archives of the Bureau, including the directives of the President and the Secretary of War, general orders issued under them, local decisions clarifying and establishing jurisdictions, and numerous

Colonel William J. Donovan

-3-

June 19, 1942

reports are the property of the War Department; (3) the military governments formerly established constitute a valuable body of precedents and traditions which are an honorable historical heritage of the United States Army.

4. While the United States possesses two competent military forces, the Army and the Navy, and although the Navy Department successfully administered military government over many years in Guam and American Samoa, in the intervention in Santo Domingo, and elsewhere, it is respectfully submitted that this responsibility is appropriately one for the Army and not for the Navy. There are certain disadvantages in imposing such duty on Navy forces. It is understood that it is not welcome service to naval officers, whose advancement is conditioned upon duty at sea. Naval forces are purely offensive forces, possessing no interests on land except their own naval bases essential to their offensive action.

On the other hand, the Army forces are those appropriate and essential for the defense and security of territory, including bases that are primarily naval bases, but which the Navy is not organized and equipped to defend alone. Particularly in time of war would it seem inadvisable to burden the Navy, whose effective action is dependent upon its complete mobility, with administrative duties which would immobilize its personnel and limit its full freedom of action. Government and administration of land areas and of alien land populations are assuredly not a normal naval function.

5. A restored Bureau of Insular Affairs need not be limited to the duties required of it in the past. It grew out of needs that followed a localized war against an opponent whose colonial possessions fell promptly into our hands. The present war is not local. American forces are established on fronts in many parts of the world. Victory for these forces will create responsibility for a large number of colonial territories, diverse in their populations, systems of law and government, economic productivity, and cultural status.

Whether the duty of administering military occupation is to be short or protracted is a matter to be settled, of course, by the negotiations of the State Department and the acts of Congress; but, in these periods short or long, the success of the American occupation will be measured by the skill with which they are conducted under military government. The task for the United States, in the event of the victory of our forces, thus promises to be a diversified and large undertaking, requiring as much preliminary preparation as time will allow. The codes of colonial law are numerous and varied. The customary law of the native populations, their attainments, aptitudes, and character differ and will require knowledge in the administrator which it cannot be assumed he possesses now. A collection of such information and its reduction for the use of Army administration would seem to be timely.

Colonel William J. Donovan


-4-

June 19, 1942

6. The Bureau of Insular Affairs, throughout many years of its service, was a valuable instrument in helping to secure a qualified personnel, both for the military governors and for the civil governments subsequently set up by act of Congress. A similar service on a wider scale is recommendable now. It is submitted that the selection and preparation of a personnel, from which qualified persons may be selected and placed under the orders of military governors as occasion requires, is a necessary and urgent activity.

The above suggestions are made with the hope that the War Department has already initiated the study and consideration of this matter, but, being based as they are upon a rather extensive personal experience with military governments and with the former Bureau of Insular Affairs itself, it is hoped that they may have some weight in whatever decision the Secretary of War deems proper at the present time.

Respectfully submitted,



DPS:RP

David Prescott Barrows

9302-0

Reykjavik, June 12, 1942

Dear Colonel:

Thanks for your letter of April 19th. Of course I think it would be all right for you to write to my brother, and I hope you will do so.

As to the copy of a letter addressed to Mr. Warburg, which you kindly enclosed, this of course refers to a matter with which we are only too familiar. The Legation has several times had to go to bat to restore popular feeling after some incident involving the troops. But these incidents, after all, have been few, and there can be no doubt that the Army is doing its best to insure proper treatment of the Icelanders while fulfilling a most complicated military mission with a hastily mustered force often deficient in training and experience. As time goes on we shall do better, I have no doubt, since the General has followed categorical orders and strict disciplinary measures with wise regulations as to the selection of sentries and special schools for their instruction. Meanwhile your man,

Mr.

Colonel William Donovan,
U. S. Government Coordinator of Information,
New York, N.Y.,
U. S. A.

93022

- 8 -

Mr. McKeever, has been very helpful to me in this connection, as well as with general propaganda such as I originally wanted him to undertake. I enclose a copy of a release to the press which he issued for me after a recent incident, and a copy of an editorial which followed in the most widely circulated of our morning papers. The governmental authorities have been consistently understanding and cooperative in regard to the difficulties which have arisen from time to time between our soldiers and individual Icelanders, and the press has latterly taken a similar attitude, largely, I believe, through the Legation's closer cooperation with reporters and editors which you have made possible.

Ever sincerely yours,

Lincoln McEachern

*P.S. How so sorry to learn of your being
ill. An automobile accident is, a rather common
to a nearly business, and inflammation is too
fine! I do hope you are feeling much better
now.*

LOCATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Reykjavik, Iceland

93024

Treas Release No. 5
June 4th, 1942.

It has been learned from the American Legation that immediate action has been taken by the military authorities in the matter of the shooting which occurred at Skerjafjordur yesterday. Several arrests have already been made to determine the responsibility for the incident.

The American Minister said he rejoiced with all Icelanders that no one was hurt in the affair, and that he has no doubt that the prompt and drastic measures of the Army Command will be effective in preventing such troubles in the future.

The American Minister said the purpose of the American presence here is two-fold: to defend Iceland and to see that no innocent person suffers in the process.

He may be attacked, he said, but any moment, from any quarter, by an enemy who is very powerful and ruthless and also very clever. That is why there are so many military zones and why they are guarded with loaded guns, and why military and naval authorities risk their lives here every day, and so often lose them.

The American Minister said, "I am alert, and intend, as called upon, to give a good account of myself for its own citizens' sake and for Iceland's too. But to make sure that its excellent alertness is at all times, and on the part of every single man, intelligent, wise and careful is another problem; and of which the Army Command is working on day and night, for the sake of the Icelanders and all other civilians who have to live among the guns and bayonets. If mistakes occur they will not be tolerated, and every effort is being made to avoid them. The lives of Icelanders and of Americans are equally dear to the authorities who are engaged in defending the island."

In conclusion, the American Minister said he wanted to thank the Icelandic press and radio for the splendid and helpful information it contained on the recent and forever regrettable shooting of the little American boy.

"You have criticized us," he said, "but you have criticized us fairly. So you have not doubted our good intentions. In so doing, you have done yourselves and your country honour, and you have made us feel more anxious than ever, if that were possible, to eradicate any faults there may be in our conduct and to make our co-operative association with Iceland closer and more effective."

SECRET

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

[illegible]

1. The first step in the process of the investigation is the identification of the subject. This is done by the use of the subject's name, address, and other identifying information. The next step is the collection of information about the subject's background, including his education, employment, and social contacts. This information is then used to determine the subject's potential for involvement in the investigation.

1. 凡在本行存款，利息按日计算，按月结息，到期支取。
2. 凡在本行存款，利息按日计算，按月结息，到期支取。
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5. 凡在本行存款，利息按日计算，按月结息，到期支取。

222 2004年第4期

A declaration from the American Legation was printed in the papers subsequent to the Chamberlain's visit. Our readers will have it fresh in their minds. Mention is there very rightly made of the danger experienced by the men who have charge of the protection of the country, that those who have this duty are fully obliged to risk their lives. For us Islanders, in our ignorance of these affairs, these things are hard to understand. But on closer consideration it becomes un-
derstandable. In order that the protective force may be maintained, it is necessary that the danger to the men who have this duty should be constantly be armed.

The Minister thanked the newspapers for what he considered the fairness of their criticism of the Government at the occasion of the Whit Sunday shooting.

Everything seems to indicate, as we mentioned above, that it is the most sincere wish and abundant purpose of the men in charge of the American Legation and the American Navy to ensure that cooperation with the Icelandic Government, and with the public throughout the land shall be as close as possible.

April 12, 1948

My dear Mr. Minister:

I am sending you a letter received by Jim Wabang, as I thought you ought to have it.

About your brother - the Army did not want us to have any observer at Portland, as it could be best cared for at Seattle. For that reason, I did not put the matter up to your brother.

However, it might be that we could develop something in which he would be interested. Do you think, therefore, it would be all right if I asked him to come to talk with me?

I have been laid up for a couple of weeks as the result of a bad automobile accident, but I am still in the ring.

I hope everything is going fine with you.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Lincoln MacVeagh
United States Legation
Reikiavik, Iceland

See memo 5/10/42
J. B. G. Watkins
R. M. S. S. S.
J. B. G. Watkins
J. B. G. Watkins
J. B. G. Watkins

April 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: J. P. Warburg
From: W. J. D.

I am sending the letter of April 17, 1942, addressed to you by J. B. G. Watkins of the American Scandinavian Foundation, to Mr. MacVeagh.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

93020
DATE: April 18, 1942.

To: Colonel Donovan
FROM: J. P. Warburg
SUBJECT:

I think this is rather disturbing. Have you any suggestions as to what we should do about it, if anything.



THE AMERICAN-SCANDINAVIAN FOUNDATION
116 EAST SIXTY-FOURTH STREET
NEW YORK

April 17, 1942

(ABLE ADDRESS SCANDINAVIAN NEW YORK)

Dear Mr. Warburg:

One of our Swedish Fellows, Åke Sandler, son of the former Foreign Minister of Sweden, who flew home last July intending to return to the University of Southern California in September, finally arrived back a couple of weeks ago by way of Rio. I had planned to give you a memo of what he had to report but, since he talked at length with both Mr. Fagrell and Mr. Fessel, I do not suppose there is anything I could add.

We have had sad stories again from Iceland. About a month ago a young engineer was driving out to visit a friend. The car was stopped by American soldiers, the driver who spoke English fairly well was questioned, and they were allowed to proceed. After a short distance they were stopped and questioned again, and again allowed to proceed. But this time an American soldier shot through the rear window of the car and struck the young engineer in the neck. He was taken to the hospital but died soon after. He was married a few months ago to Thora Borg, a sister of Anna Borg, the actress, who is the wife of the actor Paul Reumert, well known on the stage in Denmark and France.

In Hafnarfjörður, where the young fisherman was shot and killed some months ago, another boy was shot in the foot and had to have it amputated. Both of these boys happen to be former pupils of one of our Icelandic Fellows. He told me of the incident more in sorrow than in anger and said that of course people here could not understand that in Iceland the last thing they do is kill a man. He remembers only one murder during his lifetime and that was the talk of the whole country for months. He does not believe that "these boys from the South" can be made to understand entirely the Icelandic respect for human life, but feels they might be taught that such drastic methods are not necessary.

Another Fellow who spoke of the same incidents thought relations between the population and the troops could be improved by more educational work among the soldiers, either in Iceland or before they go there. Neither of these men was at all resentful and admitted that a few such incidents could hardly be avoided under the circumstances. So far as I know, these stories have not appeared in our newspapers, but of course the news comes with the Icelandic boats.

Sincerely yours,

J. B. C. Watkins
J. B. C. Watkins
Assistant Secretary

Mr. James Warburg
Office of Coordinator of Information
270 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y.

April 22, 1944

Honorable J. P. J. Male
Acting Director
Bureau of the Census
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Male:

I am in receipt of your letter of the 14th instant with which you transmit for an official view a draft of a proposed joint resolution authorizing so-called wire tapping by authorized agencies of the government in particular cases.

Inasmuch as the resolution touches no official action performed by my organization, I feel that I ought not to express an official view. However, I am of the opinion that some such legislation, if as proposed in the bill referred to, or as proposed in H. J. Res. 273 is desirable.

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Harry S. Ridgely DATE: April 9, 1948
 TO: Colonel Donovan, Administration Building
 SUBJECT: Wire Tapping by Certain Federal Investigating Agencies

Along with the attached letter which I have prepared for your signature acknowledging a letter received from the Assistant Director of the Budget concerning legislation covering wire tapping, I am handing you herewith a clipped copy of the Congressional Record for January 28 which shows the difficulties experienced in the efforts which have been made to secure the enactment of legislation authorizing official wire tapping.

It is my judgment that the draft of the proposed resolution now submitted to you by the Budget Bureau is too loosely drawn to ever secure the approval of Congress. The proposed resolution apparently leaves it to the final determination of the investigative agencies alone the need for wire tapping. Instead of requiring that before such wire tapping is undertaken, it should be personally approved by the Head of the Department in which the investigative agencies are functioning. Congressman Celler's bill set forth in the Congressional Record undertakes to correct this defect but even its language would not seem sufficiently to safeguard the matter so as to prevent legislative attack. However, I entertain no doubt that if the Budget Bureau gets in touch with the Department of Justice, they can get together in accepting Congressman Celler's bill as drawn or in procuring its amendment so as to fully serve present requirements.

attachments (2)

Harry S. Ridgely

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D. C.

APR 6 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

The Secretary of War has submitted to this office a draft of proposed legislation "To authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department to conduct certain investigations in the interest of the prosecution of the war", together with a proposed explanatory letter of transmittal to the Congress, and requests advice as to the relationship of the proposed legislation to the program of the President.

Before replying to the Secretary of War, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget would appreciate receiving an expression of your views regarding the enactment of the proposed legislation.

Very truly yours,

J. Bailey
Assistant Director,
Legislative Reference.

Honorable William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures:
Copy of draft of bill.
Copy of transmittal letter.

APR 6 1942

My dear Colonel Lammont:

The Secretary of War has submitted to this office a draft of proposed legislation to authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department to conduct certain investigations in the interest of the prosecution of the war, together with a proposed legislative letter of transmittal to the Congress, and I am giving advice as to the relationship of the proposed legislation to the program of the President.

Before replying to the Secretary of War, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget would appreciate receiving an expression of your views regarding the enactment of the proposed legislation.

Very truly yours,

Respectfully,
T. J. BAILEYAssistant Director,
Legislative Reference.Honorable William J. Lammont,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.Enclosures:
Copy of draft of bill.
Copy of transmittal letter.

COPY

The Speaker,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Speaker:

There is inclosed herewith draft of a bill, "to authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department to conduct certain investigations in the interest of the prosecution of the war," which the War Department recommends be enacted into law.

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to improve the United States espionage and counterespionage system in peace and war.

As a result of the restrictions imposed by the limitations contained in section 605 of the Act of June 19, 1914 (48 Stat. 1103), it is a criminal offense to obtain information by means of wire tapping.

It is considered essential for the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department to have the authority to obtain information by means of wire tapping in order to properly prevent or frustrate any interference or attempts to endanger the national security and defense by unlawful means. In this connection the following extracts are quoted from the Report of the Commission Appointed by the President of the United States to Investigate and report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941:

".....The United States being at peace with Japan, restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between


data and reports. The Bureau and the local intelligence staffs were unable, prior to December 7, to obtain any such information. This information was of the Japanese plans and fleet movements in the direction of Hawaii.

It was further stated that the history of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that the Japanese consul sent to the local press, and in the San Francisco Japanese press, messages on commercial matters. This activity greatly increased after December 7, 1941. The contents of these messages, if it could have been learned, might have furnished valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations with Japan, and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating agencies, they were unable prior to December 7 to obtain and examine messages transmitted through commercial channels by the Japanese consul, or by persons acting for him.

"Cause: contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:

"..... Restrictions which prevented effective counter-espionage."

SEC. 2. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application of such provision to any circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the joint resolution and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.



Who Tapping

MEMORIAL

OF

HON. EMANUEL CILLON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, January 22, 1941

Mr. CILLON. Mr. Speaker, as the Members have probably read, I have a report. I desire particularly to call attention to wire tapping, and I do so advisedly as a member of the Judiciary Committee.

Under present conditions there is a prohibition against the tapping of domestic wires and wireless. At the time of the Pearl Harbor tragedy there was a prohibition against tapping of international wires and wireless, which led undoubtedly to this tragedy at Pearl Harbor, because the members of the intelligence forces of the Army and Navy, as well as the F. B. I., were unable to tap the cables and the communications that were inaugurated by the two-hundred-odd consular agents of the Japanese Government located there. Spies and saboteurs tapped domestic and international wires and wireless but the Navy and Army were precluded.

We passed a bill recommended by the Judiciary Committee with reference to international communications. We now allow the tapping of international communications. We should also permit the tapping of domestic wires because that is just as important.

Such a bill was passed by the last Congress. It was my bill. It was lost in the Senate, and I use the word "lost" advisedly. My distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Hoesel) introduced a similar bill during my illness in the last session of the present Congress. It failed in this House of Representatives by a small margin. It is hoped that the bill which I introduced yesterday will be considered favorably by the House. It sanctions the right to tap wired and wireless communications of all sorts. At present we protect spies and fifth columnists. We cannot ferret them out unless we tap their wires.

PROTECTING THE SPIES

The Roberts Board of Inquiry late high among "causes" contributory to the success of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor certain "restrictions" which prevented effective counter espionage. These restrictions, the report explains, prevented the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Army and Navy intelligence services from resorting to "certain methods of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or radio-telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Guam and Japan." Had the Federal Bureau of Investigation and intelligence offices been permitted to intercept these messages, the report asserted, they might have obtained "valuable information."

The restrictions to which the Board referred were threefold—legislative, judicial and administrative. The legislative prohibition is a clause in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 forbidding any person to "intercept any communications and divulge or publish" them. The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase as outlawing any evidence obtained by law-enforcement officers by wire tapping or any other means of intercepting messages sent by wire or wireless. The Court's report disclosed that the War Department reinforced these statutory and judicial restrictions with an implied warning—and an obviously logical one—against use of any "illegal measures" in combating espionage. It stated that by employing illegal measures our counter-espionage agents in Japan might have been able to obtain information which would have prevented Pearl Harbor from being caught off guard on December 7 last. This natural assumption prompts the question, Why was this directive and absurd legal restriction on "effective counter espionage" permitted to continue in a time of great national emergency?

That is a long, sad, and, in view of what has happened in the Pacific, a tragic story. It is a story of too great concern in some confidential quarters over possible abuses of wire tapping and too little concern over the potential perils involved in what Justice Jackson, as Attorney General, described as guaranteeing to spies and criminals the safe use of the channels of wire and wireless. That is exactly what the present Federal Communications Commission Act, in effect, does. Investigation, Mr. Jackson, Attorney General Blaine, and President Roosevelt are among those who perceive the dangers of such a guaranty. All of them have urged enactment of special legislation to permit the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Army and Navy intelligence officers to listen in on the wire and wireless messages of spies and saboteurs and to use information thus obtained as evidence in court. The House passed a bill of this nature in August 1940, but Chairman Wheeler, of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, who dislikes wire tapping in any form allowed the bill to die in a committee pigeonhole. A second bill last year, but it was defeated in the House. And it is still pending in the Senate. The only privacy which the bill sought to invade was the use of espionage agents, saboteurs, and kidnappers.

So, Justice as it may seem, our counter-espionage agents to harvest wire tapping were compelled by the law to wait while the House and Senate passed a bill to give them the right to tap the wires and to use the information obtained to send them to the courts. And it is still pending in the Senate. The only privacy which the bill sought to invade was the use of espionage agents, saboteurs, and kidnappers.

Defense Housing in City of Washington

SPREECH

HON. ROBERT F. JONES

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, January 28, 1941

Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, I noticed by the morning press that Mr. Charles M. Palmer, Coordinator of the Division of Defense Housing Coordination, recommended a further \$50,000,000 for defense housing in the city of Washington. I do not know about the necessity immediately for the city of Washington, but I do know that an investigation ought to be made of the extent of the funds already available for housing.

There are 12 or 15 agencies of the Government handling housing. Assuming that each one of these agencies goes to a separate budget examiner, or at least some of them do, I would like to suggest that somebody has a complete over-all picture of where the money already available from Federal agencies is being spent, and whether it is being spent wisely and in the most needed spots.

Since July 1, 1940, there has been made available for housing, as far as I can check with the Budget and with other information I can command, approximately the sum of three and one-quarter billion dollars.

Congress has only appropriated directly the sum of a little over a billion dollars. You ask where this extra money is coming from.

I would like to ask if anybody knows how much the F. H. A. has insured private capital advanced for housing in defense areas. My investigation shows that it runs close to the figure of a billion dollars. Now, has Mr. Palmer, when he makes a representation to the House that we need appropriations for the District of Columbia, taken this into consideration? Has the Budget examiner, with the many agencies dipping their fingers into the pot of defense housing, a comprehensive picture of how much money is available through the Federal Housing Administration already? And that is not all, Mr. Speaker. Has Mr. Palmer taken into consideration when he testifies before the committee that the Home Loan Bank System, without direct appropriations from Congress, has dipped its fingers into the housing pot, to the tune of well over a billion dollars?

I think it is time to call a halt to further appropriations when there are so many Federal agencies with money already appropriated from the Congress handling defense housing, and with Congress about, which they obtain through a sale of their own securities and through corporate set-ups that out-smart the law, and they have several times as much available for defense housing as Congress has contemplated by appro-

Think of it again, when I see that Congress appropriated directly over a billion dollars. Another billion dollars available from funds gained in the sale of the type of corporate manipulation of the F. H. A. delegates the Government for another billion dollars worth of defense housing. Finally, if Federal agencies handle housing apparently incidentally without an over-all check in the Bureau of the Budget.

Rep. Performance by United Aircraft Corporation

REPORT OF REMARKS

HON. FRANCIS MALONEY

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, January 28 (legislative day of Friday, January 23), 1941

LETTER WRITTEN BY EUGENE H. WILSON, PRESIDENT, UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION

Mr. MALONEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the Record a letter which was published in the United States News, written by Eugene H. Wilson, president of the United Aircraft Corporation, addressed to the American people and entitled "A Report of Performance." There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,
East Hartford, Conn.

A REPORT OF PERFORMANCE

To the American people:
With a strong sense of public responsibility in matters of defense, we feel impelled to make a brief report.

Three years ago this month United Aircraft Corporation embarked upon an emergency production program. The expansion of our three major divisions—Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Hamilton Standard Propellers, and Vought-Birkenshaw Aircraft—has passed without interruption through several major phases, and is continuing. We have multiplied our plant account fourfold, our employment sixfold, and our shipments eightfold. In the year ahead we expect to produce at a higher rate than ever before.

Beginning a year and a half ago, we enlisted the support of the great automotive companies—Ford, Buick, and Chevrolet—and of many other well-known manufacturers to build Pratt & Whitney engines, Hamilton Standard propellers, and Vought-Birkenshaw planes. We have gladly furnished complete designs and technical assistance. Some of these companies have already started producing.

And what of quality? The responsibility of the aviation industry and our company, through the years since the last war was to be prepared for a war emergency, to the end that we would have available for production types of engines, propellers, and airplanes which would be unexcelled. We believe that this objective has been realized. The proof lies in the performance of American designed and built war planes, which have shown consistent

To:

Col. Donovan

FROM: WM. L. LANCER

May 31, 1948

Mr. Jerome Michael
Columbia University in the
City of New York
New York, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Michael:

Colonel Donovan has asked me to write you with regard to possible help which our organization might give in connection with the research work of the Institute of Jewish Affairs.

I believe that Colonel Donovan pointed out to you that there are certain difficulties connected with this situation and if I remember correctly I discussed it some months ago with a representative of your Institute. Perhaps it might be advisable for us to look into this problem again and I need hardly say if you or any of your representatives happen to be in Washington I should be glad to discuss possibilities with him.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Director of Research

cc/Col. Donovan
Dr. Baxter

May 15, 1942

Mr. Jerome Michael,
Columbia University in
the City of New York,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Jerome:

I am sorry not to have answered your letter before, but I have just returned to the office. In my absence, Dr. Langer has had this matter up with our people here and we are hopeful that some arrangement might be worked out that would be of advantage to both your organization and ours. I do not know whether this can be done or not, but certainly we should try to do so. Accordingly, I have asked Dr. Langer to communicate with you in the hope that a meeting may be arranged to see if some plan mutually satisfactory can be worked out.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
TO: James H. Murphy
SUBJECT: Investigation -- Use of other agencies


DATE: March 16, 1942

1. In connection with our discussion of the other day about the use of the Counter-Intelligence Corps of G-2, this is a reminder of that discussion. If we could use this service on certain detailed investigations it would be most helpful.
2. I talked on Saturday with Mr. Elmer Irey, who apparently is the head of the investigation services of the Treasury Department, and he told me that he felt sure that the Secretary of the Treasury would authorize the use of such services by us and would appoint a Liaison Officer to work with us if request were made by Colonel Donovan. This should include access to the Income Tax division, Customs division and Narcotics, and other divisions. I understand that the Treasury files are very useful.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

TO: *Col. Donnan*

You may be
interested in the
attached memo,
from Horton.



FROM: JOHN C. WILEY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Philip Hutton

DATE: August 30, 1942

TO: Mr. Poole

SUBJECT: Dr. Max Immanuel

During my stay in New York I had two visits with Dr. Immanuel who says that he will be coming to Washington again in the near future and is very eager to see Col. Donovan, whom he has already met once or twice.

He was apparently very pleased by his last interview several months ago with the Colonel, but said he was somewhat troubled that the Colonel has not since got in touch with him, as he said he would. Dr. Immanuel has heard that certain Social Democrats may have spoken to the Colonel against him, on the grounds that he once made a speech attacking the Socialists in Germany for certain policies they were pursuing.

I could not make out exactly what he wished to see the Colonel about, but gathered that it might have to do with offering information of some sort. It may well be that he is looking for a job though he said that he was at present employed by two or three large food-canning concerns in New York and was negotiating with another Washington government agency who wished him to serve full time in Washington.

Dr. Immanuel was apparently one of Hjalmar Schacht's chief assistants at the Reichsbank till 1930, when he broke with Schacht over the latter's decision to support the Nazi cause. After that time he acted as head of an organization dealing with relations between American and German business firms, until he was imprisoned by the Nazis. I believe he finally left Germany in 1936-37.

For a time he lived in England where he apparently had excellent connections in political and financial circles. His contacts in this country are equally good. He showed me letters and testimonials from the following: Emil Schram of the N.Y. Stock Exchange, Lawrence Groves of the State Dept., Douglas Miller, Louis Luchner, Arthur Garfield Hayes, Raymond Geist, and Prof. Foerster, who has known Immanuel for twenty odd years. He has also had some contact with Mrs. Roosevelt and talks mysteriously of getting in touch with the President "at the proper moment".

Dr. Immanuel also told me that he had been urged several months ago by Douglas Miller to become his assistant in the F.I.S.,

#2

but that he had refused from his dislike of what he called the Communist-friendly elements in the organization. He further said - and here again he apparently had Col. Donovan in mind - that he was extremely interested in intelligence work, in which he had had much experience, since he had served as head of such a service at the Reichsbank.

When he asked my advice about getting in touch with Col. Donovan again, I suggested that since he had already met the Colonel, it would be best to write to him directly for an appointment, possibly sending along the testimonials and letters of recommendation, which the Colonel, apparently, has not yet seen. He said that he would do this, and added that he would call me upon his arrival in Washington.

My impression of the man, aside from the somewhat mysterious air with which he clothes his intentions, was very good. His connections are without doubt very extensive and potentially very valuable.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: William L. Langer


DATE February 28, 1942

TO: Mr. Murphy

SUBJECT: U.S. INTERCEPTS OF MAIL

The matter raised by Commander Vanderbilt's memorandum to Colonel Donovan under date of February 24th, was discussed in full detail in a conference between several members of this office and high representatives of the Office of the Censor. I think everything is now clear and that nothing further needs to be done at the present time.

Perhaps you will inform Commander Vanderbilt of this situation and call his attention to the fact that questions touching the censorship should be handled by Mr. Lamont Belin.



William L. Langer
Director of Research

Dr. Langer

RECEIVED

SEP 1942

DR. R. Murphy

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

Intercepted (M...)
XC... Vanderbilt
3152
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK

Dr. Langer

February 24, 1943

To: Colonel William F. Donovan
From: William H. Vanderbilt
Subject: U.S. INTERCEPT OF MAIL

Reference my memo of February 6th, same subject:

I understand it is necessary to advise the Censor's Office in New York just what items we are interested in. I suggest that we advise them that we would like to receive all items regarding economic, political, food, and morale conditions in Europe, the Near East and North and West Africa. This information will be very helpful.

W.H.V.

WHE AM

Mr. Bruce

From Colonel Donovan

Agreed to Discuss with W.D. ~~Mr. Robin~~

~~Mr. Robin~~ Discuss with W.D. ~~Mr. Robin~~
Reference to by W.D.

Intercepts Unit 5956
Censorship Office
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION & LO. H.V. file

**170 MADISON AVENUE
 NEW YORK**

February 6, 1943

To: Colonel William J. Donovan
From: William H. Vanderbilt
Subject: U. S. INTERCEPTS OF MAIL

The United States Government has recently established, and is now in the process of building up an organization under the Army, to censor mail in New York and in other parts of the country. The New York office expects to employ 6,000 people and to handle about 450,000 items per day.

As you know, we receive intercepts of mail from the British both at Bermuda and Trinidad. It would be very helpful to us to receive the American intercepts as well. I have talked with Major Compton the Officer in charge of the New York Office, and he has advised that their present plan is to send the summary of intercepts which they will prepare, direct to Washington. The other offices throughout the country will do likewise, and any distribution will take place from their Washington office. The FBI maintains a liaison officer in the Censorship Office, and the Army is about to install one. I do not think this will be necessary in our case, but would like, if possible, to have intercepts of mail from and to Europe, the Near East and North and West Africa sent to this office direct, if possible; if not, then through Washington, and back here by pouch.

It is difficult, of course, to give them any specific items in which we are interested because we cover such a broad field. For this reason it probably would be better for us to receive the complete summary of mail from and to the areas mentioned.

It is suggested that this arrangement had best be made by you direct with the head Censorship Office in Washington.

WHV:AM

W.H.V.

February 19, 1942

Commander William E. Vanderbilt
270 Madison Avenue
New York City, New York

My dear Commander Vanderbilt:

Referring to your memorandum of January 29th inclosing an intercept from Jack Sheppard in Ecuador to Mr. Merritt of the American Weekly in New York, I am sending you a copy of a letter received from Mr. Dunn of the State Department, in reply to a letter from Colonel Donovan, calling his attention to that intercept.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Murphy:Conroy
enc.

Intercepted 3750
X Vandevliet

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


February 16, 1942

Dear Bill:

Referring to your letter of January 30, which enclosed parts of a letter written by Mr. Jack Sheppard from Quito, Ecuador, to Mr. A. Merritt, I took occasion to bring this information to the attention of our people in the American Republics Division. They informed me that this situation was brought to their attention some weeks ago and that steps have been taken to urge greater discretion upon Mr. Long.

With many thanks,

Very sincerely yours,


James Clement Dunn

The Honorable
William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

January 30, 1942

Mr. James Clement Duff
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

I am enclosing some extracts taken from a letter written by Jack Sheppard, who is located at Guilo, in Ecuador, to Mr. Herriott, Editor of the American Weekly, 235 East 45th Street, New York City.

In this letter the writer is referring to a meeting held at the American Legation in Ecuador. He strongly criticizes the method of conducting the meeting and the lack of care to insure that any information disclosed should not reach the enemy.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Encl.
Murphy: Poy

Talk. I received a note to come to the Legation at 10:00 a.m. for the meeting of U.S. citizens that had been called together over fifty of us. Frankly I was astonished at the number. The meeting was conducted and I know you will be interested to know here they would have invited you for every reason. I was to attend. In the first place the doors were wide open to the meeting room. No one was asked to show their passport or any other identification and obviously neither the Minister nor his staff knew of the Americans here. Names were asked and hands shaken, some were transiently.

Now when the Minister opened the meeting by saying that he had together to ask us what ideas we had that might be of benefit to the Agency. The Legation staff used quite a number of German names but a stenographer here and in other capacities. He seemed to come in and out at will. A Major who is here in some official capacity, gave a brief talk in which he mentioned that on the Santa Elena Peninsula of Ecuador, which is a reservation, the Nazi Germans were "officially" drilling and that they were really doing no such thing. However, they were drilling and he had an idea that it might very likely be an anti-aircraft of some sort. Then the question was raised that someone should go to get in there and have a look. The Major replied that the place was very guarded. Another American spoke up and said, "I can go freely in German and that he thought he might check the place and see what was going on. Now this in itself was much more along the same general line. But I'll bet my life that a coolen nicked that the German Legation was very word that was said at that meeting thirty minutes later. This poor devil that volunteered to get in and see what was going on at SANTA Elena wouldn't get within a mile of the place.

Now many of them, do YOU know how many of them, do YOU know to the Nazis at this moment? It was all wrong. They had been called in separately, asked what questions they had to be asked for their suggestions and then they were sent - no one should have been admitted without identification as to their being a North American. To find out how many of us spoke German, the men should not have been forced secretly. Picture for yourself the room, over fifty men present of which many were obviously to the Minister or to some other, no identification. Why didn't the Nazi activity they have in

-2-

this to a doubt, you know that there were men here that reported
every word that was said, every suggestion made. The next general
meeting is to be held at 3 P.M. on December 26th. Meanwhile, we are
all to try and think up ideas.

I have no doubt in the world but what some damned GOOD ideas
will come out of that meeting but for Christ's sake, now if you can't
get the Foreign Affairs Department to cable Long NOT to allow those
ideas to be brought out in front of 50 to 75 men, many of whom are
not known, none of whom give evidence of even their citizenship. This
is an example of pure, unadulterated stupidity. Here we are living
in a country that has around 5,000 Nazis in it and God only knows how
many pro-Nazi among the natives, and a continuation of these public
meetings at the Legation are going to be a sad mistake. Oh, it's all
right to get them together to have a pep talk and to give out the
black list and things of that sort, but when they go into ideas for
propaganda, revealing Nazi activities and asking openly how to counter
those activities and let men volunteer for jobs of espionage right
out in the open. Oh hell.... Do not if you can't contact some author-
ity that can tell these fools what bases they are trying to make of
themselves, and before the 26th if possible. Meanwhile I shall also
write a second letter to the Legation begging them to conduct this
coming - and future meetings, in a different manner... I doubt though,
if any suggestion for greater secrecy will be followed."

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

January 29, 1943

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

From: William H. Vanderbilt

Your particular attention is invited to the
attached intercept. If what this man writes
is true, I need not characterize it!

Attach.

TO: MR. J. EDGAR HOOVER
 DIRECTOR, FBI
 WASHINGTON, D.C.
 FROM: MR. J. EDGAR HOOVER
 DIRECTOR, FBI
 WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: MR. J. EDGAR HOOVER
 DIRECTOR, FBI
 WASHINGTON, D.C.
 FROM: MR. J. EDGAR HOOVER
 DIRECTOR, FBI
 WASHINGTON, D.C.

Date: 17th Dec. '41.

RECEIVED

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The writer, an American journalist (See JAN 11, 1942) attending a meeting held at the American Legation for all American citizens the manner of conducting the meeting as taken to ensure that any information disclosed as

refers to a
 lesson. He strongly
 lack of care
 not reach the enemy

Enclosure

"Today I received a note to come to the Leg. at five o'clock. I attended the meeting of U.S. citizens that had been called together. There were over fifty of us. Frankly I was astonished at the manner in which the meeting was conducted and I know you will be interested. Had you been here they would have invited you for every known American was asked to attend. At the first place the doors were wide open to the meeting room. No one was asked to show their passport or any evidence of citizenship and obviously neither the Minister nor his staff know all of the Americans here. Names were asked and none shaken, no more. Some were transients,

James Long, the Minister, opened the meeting by saying that he had brought together to ask us what ideas we had that might be useful in this emergency. The Legation staff used quite a number of translators not only as servants but as stenographers and in other capacities. These people wandered in and out all day. A U.S. Major who is here, doubtless in some official capacity, gave a brief talk in which he brought out that as the Santa Elena Peninsula of Ecuador, which is a strategic location, the Nazi Germans were "officially" drilling us all but that they really were doing no such thing. Moreover, they WERE doing SOMETHING and he had an idea that it might very likely be an anti-American plot of some sort. Then the question was raised that someone ought to try to get in there and have a look. The Major replied that the section was heavily guarded. Another American spoke up and said that he could converse freely in German and that he thought he might be able to "crack" the place and see what was going on. Now this is just a sample. There was much more along the same general lines. But I'm sure, I'd bet my life against a sudden attack that the German Legation know every word that was said at that meeting thirty minutes after it was over. This poor devil that volunteered to get in and see what the Nazis are up to at SANTA Elena wouldn't get within a mile of the place.

File 1000/41
(Cont'd)

- 2 -

Many other good ideas were brought out at that meeting, but you think, will be unknown to the Nazis at it. You are all wrong. These Americans should have been called separately, asked what qualifications they had to be of help, asked for suggestions and ideas, and at the very least - no one should have been admitted without positive identification as to their being a North American. To find out, as they wanted to, how many of us spoke German, the ask should not have been forced to stand up and hold on high their hand. That information too, should have been given secretly. Picture for yourself, a wide open assembly room, over fifty men present of which many were obviously unknown either to the Minister or to each other, no identification required to attend. Why with all the Nazi activity they have in this town don't you KNOW that there were men there that reported every word that was said, every suggestion made? The next general meeting is to be held at 8 P.M. on December 20th. Meanwhile we are all to try and think up ideas.

I haven't a doubt in the world but what some damned GOOD ideas will come out at that meeting but for Christ's sake, see if you can't get the Foreign Affairs Department to cable Long NOT to allow these ideas to be brought out in front of 50 to 75 men, many of whom are not known, none of whom give evidence of even their citizenship. This is an example of pure, unadulterated stupidity. Here we are, living in a country that has around 8,000 Nazis in it and God only knows how many pro-Nazi among the natives. And a continuation of these public meetings at the Legation are going to be a real mistake. Oh, it's all right to get them together to have a pep talk and to give out the black list and things of that sort, but when they go into ideas for propaganda, revealing Nazi activities and asking openly how to counter these activities and let men volunteer for jobs of espionage right out in the open. Oh hell..... Do see if you can't contact some authority that can tell these fools what asses they are trying to make of themselves, and before the 20th if possible. Meanwhile I shall also write a second letter to the Legation begging them to conduct this coming - and future meetings, in a different manner... I doubt though, if my suggestion for greater secrecy will be followed."

JUN 15 1941

MEMORANDUM TO MR. J. R. HAYDON:

You are directed to undertake the establishment within this organization of a training school for instruction of individuals in the principles and practices of special intelligence work.

In order to carry out this task, you will be supplied by me with necessary funds and equipment.

You will submit to me, as soon as practicable, a proposal for the operation of such a school.

William J. Donovan

Since 18/01/01
2411
526
THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

January 10, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

Your kind letter of January 6th, regarding the cooperation of the Institute for Advanced Study in your studies in the field of foreign politics as they are projected into the United States, has come while Dr. Aydelotte is away from his office. It will be brought to his attention as soon as he returns.

Very truly yours,

Maria C. Eichelman
Secretary to Dr. Aydelotte

January 6, 1941

Dr. Frank Aydelotte, President
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Dr. Aydelotte:

Through Dr. Poole I have heard of the cooperation and support which the Institute for Advanced Study is giving to our studies in the field of Foreign politics as they are projected into the United States, and I wanted to let you know of my very sincere appreciation. I am writing a line also to Professor Meritt, who, I understand, is going to take the active leadership.

Cordially yours,

William J. Donovan

DCPoole:asl
WJ:KMD



January 6, 1941

Dr. Benjamin D. Meritt
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Professor Meritt:

Through Mr. Poole I have heard of your generous and patriotic offer to help with our studies of foreign politics as they are projected into the United States and I hasten to let you know of my sincere appreciation.

I hope that you will visit Washington soon and that I can then have an opportunity of talking with you.

Cordially yours,

William J. Donovan

DCP:asl

WJ

1-8-42
Mr. Wiley:

Mr. Pate

Dear John:

This arrangement is excellent.
May I have a copy of the memo of Jan. 6
for R&A files? Congratulations.

Jim

JAMES P. BAXTER, 3rd

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WILEY

January 6, 1942.

Over the week-end in Princeton, I was happy to be able to conclude tentatively what seemed to me very advantageous arrangements with Professor Benjamin D. Meritt at the Institute for Advanced Study.

You will recall that Professor Meritt lived for a long time in Greece, commands modern Greek and has a wide acquaintance among Greek-Americans. He feels an ardent wish to serve the Country at this juncture. He is therefore ready to undertake, at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, on an entirely voluntary basis, an active contact with the Greek-American world, including scanning of the Greek-American press.

Following my preliminary talk on this subject with Professor Meritt two weeks ago, he discussed the matter with Dr. Aydelotte, Director of the Institute for Advanced Study. Dr. Aydelotte approved heartily of Professor Meritt undertaking this work. He also said that costs of about \$100 per year --- which was Professor Meritt's estimate of subscription expenses for Greek-American periodicals, would be paid out of the funds of the Institute. In addition, there become available to us Professor Meritt's ample offices and his secretarial staff.

Professor Meritt, who has a keen political intelligence in addition to high standing as a scholar, is acquainted not only with Greece but with the whole Eastern Mediterranean region. Moreover, he has colleagues at the Institute who command Italian and other Mediterranean languages. In these circumstances, Professor Meritt is willing to develop contact work for us, relating

- 2 -

not only to Greece but also to Italy, Bulgaria, Turkey, and possibly Yugoslavia later on.

While in Princeton I had a long talk also with Professor Philip K. Hitti, the distinguished Arabic scholar. Professor Hitti already reads the more important Arabic language newspapers published in the United States. He offered us his whole^{hearted} cooperation and I can readily bring it about that he will cooperate with Professor Meritt and so add to the voluntary work which is being placed at our disposal a very^{valu}able extension into the whole Arab and Moslem world.

I may add that Mr. Amoss was with me in Princeton on Monday. Mr. Amoss, Professor Meritt and I had a conference extending over several hours. I am happy to report that Mr. Amoss and Mr. Meritt liked each other, and each subsequently expressed a high regard for the others capability in the political field in question.

The only return which I foresee to be incumbent upon us will consist of (1) the payment of some small expenses which may be incurred by Professor Hitti and one or two other helpers who (unlike Professor Meritt) are not in a position to offer more than their own personal time; and (2) suitable acknowledgements to Professor Meritt and others for their cooperation. The latter will include occasional visits to Washington for the purpose of consultation and appropriate letters of thanks at the right times. In the latter connection, I attach herewith letters to Professor Meritt and Dr. Aydelotte which Colonel Donovan may be willing to sign at this time.

- 3 -

You will recall that after consultation with you I spoke to Colonel Donovan about these arrangements and he approved of them heartily -- subject to clearance with Dr. Baxter. I then spoke to Dr. Langer (Dr. Baxter being absent from the city) and Dr. Langer expressed his enthusiastic approval, as was duly recorded in a memorandum at the time.



D. C. Poole